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THE INFLUENCE

OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON PUBLIC OPINION AND
LEGISLATION. By M. Louise Rutherford. The Foundation Press, Chicago,

1937. Pp. ix, 393. Price: $3.00.
The historian who makes a contemporary survey of a nation or an institution is fortunate if he can write as of the end of an era or an epoch. When
M. Louise Rutherford began her assembly of material for an appraisal of the
influence of the American Bar Association upon public opinion and legislation,
it is probable that she had chiefly in mind a new task of research and evaluation
which might win acceptance in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy. By the time her work had been completed and accepted
after defense of thesis, her dissertation in political science took on an added and
unforeseen historical value, in that she had surveyed and appraised a completed
period in the growth and work of the Association-a period during which the
national organization of the bar had proceeded, for nearly sixty years, in a belief
that the profession of law was best represented and led by an aristocracy of selfselected leaders "at the top", rather than by the development and expression
of the views of the whole membership, directly and through delegates chosen by
the membership. Of the Association which began with a small and selected
group at Saratoga Springs, New York, in 1878, and gained gradually in influence,
usefulness and membership, until finally the state and local bar associations
joined hands with the rank and file of American Bar Association members in
forcing the adoption of a representative structure of organization in 1936, Mrs.
Rutherford has written a complete chronicle and has rendered a timely service
in so doing.
Her data were evidently assembled in 1935 and early 1936. When the
government of the Association was thoroughly reorganized and largely decentralized in August of 1936, she added text and foot-notes which told of the
changes. But the volume went to press before anyone had an opportunity to
observe and estimate the effects of the 1936 transition. In this respect, she is
fortunate, inasmuch as her volume will be accepted as the unbiased and authoritative account of the work and influence of the Association during the years
when it was led and controlled by a numerous, disinterested, and largely unselfish
group of public-spirited lawyers who were willing to devote their time and
energies to its comprehensive programs. The appraisal of the Association as a
federation of state and local bar associations governed by delegates elected at
home in the states and localities, and resorting in major controversies to mailballot votes of the membership, will be written at some future time as a separate
narrative, against the background of Mrs. Rutherford's chronicle of the years
of leadership by volunteers.
Although she is a lawyer in active practice, Mrs. Rutherford says that she
"holds no brief for lawyers, individually or as organized in bar associations.
The purpose of this study is to gather facts," etc. Whatever predilections and
hopes she may have for her chosen profession, she manifestly laid them aside, in
favor of a scientific approach and open-minded analysis of the data which she
brought together for the first time. By practically all reviewers and commentators, including some who have never shown bias in favor of the Association,
her claim to have presented us with "a scientific piece of work written with no
preconceived ideas or prejudices" is accepted and conceded. Her starting-point
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was that "There is need of factual data regarding the policies and activities of
the American Bar Association because the profession of law represents a public
profession and occupies a strategic position in the government and the society
politic." Others have written biographies of leaders of the bar and polemics
upon particular issues; this volume records the work done and the results
attained by committees and by sections whose members were numerous and are
unnamed-lawyers who already are practically forgotten, even in their home
communities, but who in their time worked hard from a sense of public spirit and
,pontributed much to the useful service of the Association to the public and the
profession.
Mrs. Rutherford's critical examination of the record as to what the American
Bar Association has done and failed to do since 1878 gains present significance
because she projects it against a background of the state of the world today.
She begins by noting that "the capacity of democratic government to maintain
and defend itself is being questioned" in many countries. As one of the causes,
she postulates "the failure to organize services of voluntary groups, especially
those expert in government and law." If this failure can be overcome and if
independent, volunteer agencies can implement public opinion with trained and
disinterested judgment comparable with that mobilized by governmental staffs,
the author believes that thereby will be created agencies which may help counterbalance the trends toward arbitrary, personal power and popular dependence on
government.
Casting about for support of her thesis that "the voluntary services of
unbiased experts in government should be evaluated and used", Mrs. Rutherford
saw that "The American Bar Association may constitute one of these voluntary
groups." She says that "this study represents an effort to obtain facts in relation
to what contribution, if any, the American Bar Association has made and is
making in the field of government and administration." Her philosophy of what
can be done by such an institution is expressed in apt quotation from Mr. Harold
J. Laski's Politics, that "Effective public opinion for the purpose of government,
in a word, is almost always opinion which is organized and differentiated from
that of the multitude by the possession of special knowledge". Although she
recognizes that, as has been many times demonstrated, such a group as the
American Bar Association could not, if it would, dictate or control public opinion
or determine the votes or views of even its own members, she finds that "lawyers,
because of their training and acquirement of specialized knowledge" and because
of the nation-wide character of the profession and its highly diversified membership, may well be in a position to assist and implement public opinion in matters
pertaining to the administration of justice, the competent functioning of democratic government, and the enforcement of rules of law as obstacles to collectivist
interference with individual rights which are fundamental in a free society. She
trenchantly says:
"Though governmental problems are difficult of solution, yet quacks and
charlatans are not lacking with their ready remedies. Little is accomplished
by ballyhoo. There are no panaceas, especially for governmental and legal
problems; only knowledge and organization can offer workable solutions."
"There is need of perfecting the democratic process, especially in the fields
of law making, law enforcement, and interpretation . . . . Can the organized Bar be of any assistance in obtaining efficiency in the functioning of
democratic government ?"
This reviewer has outlined and quoted at length Mrs. Rutherford's statement
of her basic point of view and purpose, as well as the tests of usefulness which
she applied to the institution under scrutiny; they are in a sense as significant
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and timely as are her accumulation and analysis of data. Does an independent,
self-governing institution comprised of 31,000 trained lawyers scattered through
all of the states, give any actual aid to democratic government, and constitute
any dependable bulwark against opinion subsidized and supported by the pursestrings of centralized government? Has the great bulk of the work of legislation
and regulation, and of the administration of justice, been in any respects better
done, because of the availability of the expert aids marshalled under the auspices
of the American Bar Association? Are there substantial grounds for hoping
and believing that, in times when great issues as to the continuance of free institutions are at stake, the organized lawyers of the country can help to crystallize
and lead an aroused public opinion in defense of the fundamentals of democratic
government? These are questions to which by no means all of the partisans of
the profession of the law have been prepared to return affirmative answers with
much confidence. The need for answering such questions emphatically in the
affirmative may have been among the impelling reasons for the adoption of the
present democratic structure of organization of the Bar. Yet Mrs. Rutherford
surveyed, from the point of view already quoted, nearly sixty years of the Association's history under its old organization and leadership, and she found that its
services to the public and to the profession have been so numerous and so substantial that the Association has on the whole met the tests which she laid down
for her evaluation. In consequence, Mrs. Rutherford ranks the American Bar
Association of 1878 to 1936 as one of the representative, independent and highly
useful public institutions whose activities may be a bulwark against extensions
of arbitrary power and against casual, untrained experimentation in the processes
of administering justice and conducting government. Never before had the full
record been dug out and pieced together; undoubtedly many members of the
Association, as well as most of its critics, have been surprised to see how impressive and convincing a story it makes. The author adhered resolutely to the record,
and not only made competent and exhaustive research among published and
unpublished documents to which she is able to refer categorically in foot-notes,
but has also consulted extensively the recollection of many persons identified
with the events which she records. She gives facts, and is chary about opinions.
All in all, she rendered a real service to the public as well as to the profession
of law; she made a most readable dissertation on a factual subject which might
have been made deadly dull. It is of minor importance that there are noteworthy
omissions from her summary of the services performed by the Association, and
that she confined herself steadfastly to facts for which she could cite record
references, even at the cost of failing to catch altogether the spirit and the pur-"
poses which have animated the many activities and have seemed to many persons
to be the ultimate test of their worth. Her study has the demerits as well as
the merits of being resolutely factual; it does not attempt to evaluate the intangibles or the imponderables.
Within the space which this review can reasonably occupy, it is impossible to
reproduce here the items of her evaluation or the impressive array of facts with
which it is supported. Of outstanding significance is her revelation that a relatively small part of the work of the Association is in controverted or contested
fields, except as minor special interests or parochial views may interject themselves as opposing elements. Preponderantly, the activities of the Association
relate to matters in which the expert assistance and counsel of Association committees and groups are cordially welcomed and availed of and are substantially
unopposed. The inference seems warranted that the author is of the opinion
that the Association has been of the greatest usefulness and influence when it
has given active aid to improvement of the administration of justice and to
trained draftsmanship in the processes of legislation. Nevertheless, the record
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indicates that the Association has rarely hesitated to speak and act boldly on
controversial issues, if the independence of the administration of justice, the
good repute of the profession, or the fundamentals of free government according
to law, appeared to be at stake. The volume is noteworthy, not only for its
thoroughness in research and skill in the presentation of material, but also for
the timeliness of its appearance, just as the Association appears to be moving
ahead to realize a broadened concept of its functions and its usefulness. There
is sanity and force in Mrs. Rutherford's admonition: "One of the most effective
means of creating a favorable public opinion is through the performance of a
necessary public service. 'If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?'
Genesis 4:7". The author's demonstrated conclusion is that the Association
has long performed "a necessary public service", and her dissertation has been
accepted by a distinguished faculty of political science, after defense of thesis.
Not a few persons who have held a high opinion, now confirmed, as to the
usefulness of the American Bar Association as heretofore organized and led, will
lay this volume down with some misgivings. If so much has been done so well,
what considerations could have warranted thorough-going change in structure
and processes? Can the country be assured that under a democratized control
by elected representatives of the states and localities, the practical results will be
as good as, or better than, those attained under the guidance of a volunteer,
selective group, who were disinterested, public-spirited, and animated by a sense
of obligation to their profession and their country? To questions such as these,
Mrs. Rutherford's volume of course gives no answer. She wrote only of achievements under a form of organization and a concept of control considerably different
from that obtaining today; she had no opportunity to survey and evaluate the
extensive use of referenda, in 1937, as the means of deciding the attitude and
action of the Association upon major questions of policy such as the proposed
re-making of the Supreme Court of the United States; likewise no opportunity
to narrate and appraise the functioning of the new House of Delegates and the
substantial results achieved by it during the first year ended at Kansas City
about October first. In the final analysis, the answer to any misgivings about
the wisdom of the considerable change at a critical time will rest with the changed
and changing leadership of the Association; their course of action will determine
whether democracy in the government of a national organization of the Bar
means a scattering and dissipation of energies; whether will-o'-the-wisps will
be pursued and energies expanded beyond resources and beyond the capabilities
of the volunteer efforts of lawyers otherwise busy with the work of their profession; and whether the substantial achievements of the past sixty years can be
surpassed or matched, under a more democratic government of the Association
and a more frequent consultation of the views of the rank and file of its members.
From a long-run point of view, this reviewer thinks that it must be recognized that the distinguished service record of the Association since i878 has
been and is the foundation on which the present broader and more representative
structure has been logically brought into being. There were few local bar associations, and fewer state associations, when the American Bar Association was
organized. There was then no thought of the integrated, inclusive bar organizations which now are in effect in sixteen states and embrace all of their lawyers.
About ioo,ooo lawyers now are members of state bar organizations. With nearly
30,000 members, the American Bar Association had definitely outgrown its own
form of organization and operation; plainly it could not act or speak in the name
of the organized profession of law, unless it gave a voice and vote to the state bar
associations and the larger local bar associations, constituting much more than a
majority of the practising lawyers of the whole country. No matter how wise,
patriotic and disinterested was the control of the American Bar Association
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during the years in which it attained stature as an important and useful institution
in the domain of law and justice and government, the time indubitably came
when a more representative and authoritative voice of the bar was needed in
many public affairs. The present structure, federating the state associations,
the larger local associations, and various affiliated organizations of high standing,
into a House of Delegates of the legal profession, was a logical and inescapable
step forward-in the judgment of many persons, it was taken none too soon.
Mrs. Rutherford's volume should be chart and compass for those who wish to
keep the Association within fields of practicable usefulness.
William L. Ransom.t

DISTRAINT UNDER FEDERAL REVENUE LAWS.

Law Book Company, Washington, 1937.

By Kingman Brewster.
Pp. xiv, 200.

National

Price: $3.50.

This does not purport to be a scholarly book. As the author himself states
in the preface, it is "compiled for the purpose of assembling in one place the
statutes, regulations, published instructions and precedents, relating to the right
of the Federal government to distrain in the collection of Federal revenues". The
net result is a thin gloss upon some dozen-odd sections of Internal Revenue
statutes.
Without doubt the book would be handy to have around were one confronted with the necessity of action in the face of a federal distraint. The citations appear to be sufficiently complete to save one the task of wading through
the numerous indices to the Treasury Decisions and the Cumulative Bulletins
and the various Regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The index to
the book is quite complete, consisting of thirty pages of index for one hundred
and thirty pages of text.
It is not entirely fair to criticize an author for failure to do that which he
did not profess to do. However, upon reading the book I had a distinct feeling
that Mr. Brewster might well have used a little more time and effort to present
a solution to some of the problems which the book suggests. Take, for example,
the discussion of remedies against the property of a bankrupt taxpayer. Bankruptcy will prevent distraint upon property in the custody of the bankruptcy
court. The United States may file its claim therein for taxes and is accorded a
certain priority therefor. The claim for taxes is not discharged by the discharge
in bankruptcy. However, one may ask will it affect the lien for taxes in any
way if the claim for taxes is made but not satisfied in full? What of homestead
and other exemptions in bankruptcy as against the claim for Federal taxes?
Does the taxpayer threatened with distraint have anything to gain by filing a
petition in bankruptcy? Or do his creditors? These questions go unanswered.
Consider certain constitutional problems. In his four page discussion, the
author is content to state that distraint is a constitutional method of collection,
and that the present statutory provisions for notice are sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process of law. In view of certain decisions in the state
courts, one might reasonably ask whether any notice is required prior to the
distraint. To what extent may the possible constitutional requirements of notice
be affected by the existing stringent statutory prohibitions against injunctive
interference with distraint process? Other issues suggest themselves, but to no
avail.
A more or less obvious effort to fill space results in the inclusion of twentyseven pages of unnecessary forms. In addition to ten common printed forms of
t Member of the New York Bar; former President of the American Bar Association.
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the Bureau of Internal Revenue, there is included (of all things !) a copy of the
"advertising order" issued by governmental bureaus to newspapers in connection
with legal publications, and including two pages of instructions to the printer,
et cetera. This is followed by a two-page printed form supplied to the publisher
for use in maldng his claim for payment for the advertisement. Still further to
exasperate the book-buying public, one finds that this last form is reprinted
in duplicate. A copy of a Treasury Warrant would make the series complete.
Arthur Leon Harding4f

RoLLs OF

THE JUSTICES IN EYRE FOR YORKSHIRE IN 3 HENRY III (1218-19).
Edited by Doris Mary Stenton. Selden Society Publications, Vol. 56.
Bernard Quaritch, London, 1937. Pp. lvi, 577. Price: 56s 6d.
This year's Selden Society volume continues the publication of the Eyre
Rolls, and can, therefore, as the editor suggests, profitably be compared with the
Worcestershire eyre of the same year, published in 1934, as part of Volume 53
of the Selden Society Publications, and also edited by Mrs. Stenton. The
contrast brings into sharp relief the conditions in these two shires, and their
different social and economic backgrounds.
Of the quality of the work done, little need be said. Mrs. Stenton continues
the splendid tradition begun, as far as women are concerned, by Miss Mary
Bateson. Mrs. Stenton's work is marked by the same careful and accurate
scholarship shown in her other publications. She undertook what the seventeenth
century called a "painful" task. These membranes are difficult enough to read
under the best conditions; and this particular manuscript is damaged and
probably incomplete. Beside the pleas themselves, Mrs. Stenton publishes the
memoranda roll of the same eyre in which the judges had marked for themselves
the matters which they intended to investigate further or which they felt it
desirable to adjourn to Westminster.
The special interest of this roll, as in the case of the Worcestershire eyre,
is its connection with Bracton. He quotes from it and some of the cases can be
identified. Mrs. Stenton examines the relation of the material to Bracton and
devotes the rest of the Introduction to a discussion of other matters contained here,
then following the usual practice of these volumes in which a lengthy introduction
takes the place of notes. Of the topics more fully noticed, three, "The Judges",
"The Trial of Criminals" and "Misery and Poverty" will probably seem most
interesting.
One of the judges is Martin de Pattishall. Indeed, Bracton describes the
eyre as that "of the Bishop of Durham and Martin de Pattishall", but no less
than thirteen other judges are named or referred to in these pleas, and some of
them have no other profession-except their clerical character-than that of
being judges. The English judicial system already had a history in 1218, but it
was still in its early stage and in the material presented here, an important epoch
in its growth can be studied.
It was a critical time in most respects. The war against John which outlasted John himself, had, in 1217, just ended, with the expulsion of Louis of
France. New disturbances, of course, were certain to break out, and as we know
soon did, but the eyre itself took place in a lull between these storms of feudal
turbulence. The situation caused by the war, so far as it affected property, law
and order, is often mentioned in the pleas, and is discussed in the Introduction.
Prisons were broken, chattels irrecoverably lost and lands so harried that the
justices found it difficult at times either to determine facts or do justice.

t Professor of Law, University of Idaho.
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The dwarfing of great events by proximity is excellently illustrated. Magna
Carta had been issued in 1215 and twice reissued (1216 and 1217) in the name
of the infant Henry III, but in these 1150 cases there is no reference to it. Indeed,
in No. 57 o , William of Crideston pays half a mark for a writ de odio et atia which
by the great Charter he might have had for nothing. I may perhaps suggest that
the lex civitatis of York (No. 8o8) is a special illustration of the meaning I have
ventured to suggest for the much discussed per legem terre of the Charter.,
Of noted men, there is a reference to the famous Rannulf of Blundevil, Earl
of Chester, who became a popular ballad-hero a century later (No. 315), and
was then away "on God's service in the land of Jerusalem". Rannulf is being
sued in an assize of novel disseisin by Maurice de Gaunt whom he had captured
at Lincoln in the war and had ransomed for the huge sum of 15oo marks, 5 horses
each worth 15 marks and 5 hawks. War in feudal times was not without its
element of profit.
Rannulf had been on John's side, but another person who appears here
is William de Forz, Count of Aumale, who might perhaps have been more familiarly called Earl of Albemarle (Nos. 683 and 115o). This unprincipled adventurer was one of the baronial committee at Runnymede, and shifted to John and
back again. Characteristically, in these two cases, the jurors and the sheriff
plead that they "can say nothing" about the royal claims in their region "because
of the Earl of Albemarle".
Mrs. Stenton calls attention to the grimness of the life which these Yorkshire rolls attest. Suicides are frequent; rape, robbery, murder and sudden death
follow each other in the record. A boy of ten kills another boy of the same age
at Kelperthorpe (No. 942) and is adjudged an outlaw. And in the immediately
following plea, a man and his wife are arrested before they take sanctuary, and
are charged with the murder of a child whose body was found in an earthen pot
in a pit. One may readily guess that if the perpetrators had not been so quickly
discovered, the Jews of the neighborhood-Jews are several times mentionedwould have been accused of a ritual murder.
How perilous life was is indicated by the large number of homicide cases
and the fact that in twenty instances of obvious murder the slayer is declared to
be unknown. The ruffianly gangster-almost surely a nobleman-who went
from place to place attended by fifteen mounted followers in livery, robbing
with apparent impunity, recalls the constant problem of maintenance. In felonies
the usual method of procedure was the appeal and trial by battle. The relatively
new machinery of the trial inquest-ordeals had just been abolished-was not
effective in bringing criminals to justice. No conviction by a jury is recorded,
although a jury was often used.
Not only the social and legal historian but the economic historian as well
will discover much to interest him in this roll. We find a cart worth two marks
in No. IO92-about 26 shillings-and in another place (No. 762) a cart and
horse worth two shillings sixpence. A boat worth three pence (No. 875) must
be put at the side of a boat worth more than fifty times as much (No. 555). A
horse worth one shilling is mentioned in No. 1033, one worth twenty'in No. 443,
and others worth fifteen marks a piece or two hundred shillings (No. 315).
These last were part of a nobleman's ransom. Pigs cannot have been common,
since the cheapest is valued at sixpence (No. 667), while two "bovates" of land
(anywhere from fifteen acres to three times as much) brought in only three
shillings a year (No. i49).
The only proper comment on such a book as a Selden Society volume is
a running commentary on the pleas. Evidently even a selection from such a
i. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
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commentary would unconscionably extend a review. A few items may perhaps
be mentioned. The long plea (No. i49) which is repeated verbatim involves
the extraordinary situation of a writ which the sheriff's clerks have lost and for
which the sheriff is said to have arranged to give the plaintiff one bovate of land,
without prejudice to the latter's right to get the remainder. Further, the defendant at Westminster brings letters patent from the judges themselves about what
went on before them on the eyre. Both these matters are of moment in the
development of procedure as well as of the notion of an official record.
In twenty-four instances, pleas are adjourned and excuses made because
the person in question has gone in or versus terrain Jerusalemitanam. These
cases are taken by Mrs. Stenton to refer to the crusade. That certainly holds
for Rannulf of Chester, who, however, had gone to Egypt to besiege Damietta
and not to Palestine at all. Indeed, the entire crusading effort of the previous
decade had been directed against Egypt and Constantinople. During the seven
or eight years before the events of this eyre, Palestine itself was at peace under
the truce granted by Saladin's brother and successor, Malik-el-Adil.
Since no less than three of these persons are women, in one case (No. 431)
apparently a woman of middle age, we may wonder whether most of these
voyages are not to be considered pilgrimages or attempts at a pilgrimage. Mrs.
Stenton so renders the phrase in Nos. 174 and 208. Perhaps the special phrase
"on God's service" in the case of the Earl of Chester is meant to mark
a
distinction.
There are three instances of the assize of nuisance. If any doubt still prevails about the connection of the possessory assizes with the Roman interdicts,
whether or not through the canonical actio spolii, that doubt ought to be lessened
by comparing cases like Nos. 91 and 404 with the interdictum de via publica and
de aqua cottidiana et aestiva.
Of other miscellaneous matters, we may note the frequency of the penalty
of beheading, the serf who placed himself on a jury of the "poor free men of
the country (patria)" (No. 1024), the thirty-five compurgators in York in felony
cases (No. SoS). The usual number here, as elsewhere in England, is twelve.
The number thirty-five, a privilege of the city, recalls the large numbers used in
Celtic communities, like the assache of Wales and the whole armies of compurgators in Scotland. It is surprising in so Germanic a region as Yorkshire. Another special custom is the unusual rule in regard to marital property (No. 292).
Attention may further be called to the fact that since we are in the Danelaw,
frank-pledge is unknown, as well as presentment of Englishry.
In No. 433, sectam facere is rather "made pursuit" than "made suit". The
hue and cry is involved, which is called a consuetudo regni, a phrase that should
perhaps be rendered, "custom of the realm" rather than "of the country", since
the last word suggests the more usual and quite different patria.
It would be almost impossible to exhaust the gleanings that might be made
from this admirable volume. Our debt to Mrs. Stenton and to the Selden Society
is greatly increased by it.
Max Radin.t
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

By Reynolds

Robertson and Francis R. Kirkham. West Publishing Co., St. Paul and
Vernon Law Book Co., Kansas City, 1936. Pp. vii, 1048. Price: $15.00.
This volume is a practicing lawyer's handbook. Though the ordinary practitioner will seldom have occasion to seek review in the Supreme Court of tho
t Professor of Law, University of California.
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United States, by reason of that fact it is all the more valuable to one not well
versed in the subject matter of the jurisdiction of the Court when occasion arises
for filing a petition for certiorari or seeking an appeal. The book has been
criticized as being "drier than dust" and as lacking in exciting discussion such
as has been stimulated by the events of the past year. Criticism of that tenor
would seem to be entirely beside the point. The authors have attempted "a
comprehensive treatment of the direct appellate jurisdiction" of the Court. They
have logically laid out the jurisdictional prerequisites to a review of the judgments of state and federal courts. In addition one part of the treatise is devoted
to the exercise of the Court's discretionary review by certiorari, and one to problems of procedure, both jurisdictional and otherwise. In the main they have
limited themselves to questions which have been specifically settled by cases so
as to give an accurate statement of the existing state of the law. Most certainly
exciting discussion is missing. But the groundwork for theorizing on speculative considerations which may or may not affect particular decisions in the field
is there. To one of theorizing bent who is thoroughly versed in the decisions
of the Court on jurisdictional problems the book may be of little aid or interest.
But to the practicing lawyer there is value.
That there was need for a work of this type would appear to be evident
from the number of petitions for certiorari denied and the nunber of appeals
dismissed during a given term of the Court.1 Some there may be who lay the
blame for this at the door of the Court. Even to those, however, it must be
apparent that numbers of petitions for certiorari are denied and many appeals
are dismissed for reasons which were wholly predictable in advance. This is
easily demonstrable in the case of appeals by virtue of the statement of the
reasons for dismissal in short per curiam opinions. Though certiorari is rarely
denied with an expression of a reason for such action, 2 an examination of petitions and records would reveal in the great majority of instances that a denial
was logically to be expected upon jurisdictional or other grounds.8 The leading
cases which counsel should have in mind both in laying the groundwork for
review and in determining whether review is possible have been collected by
the authors, and the principles derived therefrom have been stated in a clear and
logical form. Use of the book should not only be of aid to the attorney, but to
i. During the 1936 term 671 of the 824 petitions filed were denied. Frankfurter and Fisher,
The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936 (1938) 51 HAv.
L. REv. 577, 594. These figures while correct in reflecting the number of petitions to which
were assigned docket numbers are not precisely accurate in indicating the number of cases
upon which the Court exercises an independent judgment, for in many instances one petition
may be assigned two or more docket numbers or several petitions seeking review of judgments in consolidated or related cases may present identical questions. Precise figures upon
the latter basis, so far as obtainable, would indicate a smaller percentage of denials. Approximately 5o per cent of the appeals filed during the 1936 term were dismissed upon preliminary
inspection of the jurisdictional statements and records. Id. at 587. In the majority of instances
the basis for dismissal is the want of a substantial federal question. Other usual reasons are
the want of a final judgment, the failure to properly present or raise a Federal question, the
failure to attack the validity of a statute or the fact that the judgment of the court below
was based upon an adequate non-federal ground. These reasons are all applicable to appeals
from state courts. Dismissals of appeals from federal courts are not frequent.
2. Cf. Lee v. Florida, 299 U. S. 542 (1936) ; Simpson v. Florida, 299 U. S. 543 (1936);
In each of these cases petitions for
Sand Springs Home v. Naharkey, 299 U. S. 588 (936).
writs of certiorari were denied for want of a final judgment.
3. As one instance, the practice of the Court not to grant certiorari in ordinary patent
cases in the absence of a real conflict of opinion between circuit courts of appeal has been
pointed out by the Court. See Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261 U. S.
387, 388, 393 (1923) ; Keller v. Adams-Campbell Co., 264 U. S. 314, 319 (1924). Each
term petitions seeking review in such cases are filed and denied.
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the Court as well. That the authors were well fitted to the task would seem
apparent 4 and the result is very satisfactory.
As with any text book, however, it should be recognized that the cases are
the ultimate authority. General statements deduced therefrom are not always
satisfactory. In at least one instance the authors have been guilty of ambiguity
in attempting a generalization on the basis of a particular case.5 Moreover statements of principles, though set forth in clear and simple language, often convey
no real meaning as to the substantive content of the particular rule under discussion. Thus, the test for determining whether a judgment is joint or several
for the purpose of summons and severance is said to be whether the judgment is
joint on its face or separable in law and fact. There is no real discussion as to
what is the nature of a joint or several judgment for the purpose of summons
and severance, and merely a few instances of the application of the doctrine are
given in the entire chapter on the subject.6 On the other hand, in the interesting
chapters on the exercise of the discretionary power to review by certiorari many
illustrative instances are given. Such illustrations, taken from cases recently
acted upon by the Court, are instructive.
A check of the citations in the footnotes, with which the book is replete,
reveals that many recent cases are cited. A large number of these cases, however, are merely reported as orders denying certiorari or per curiam opinions dismissing appeals. Where not adequately covered by the text it would have been
helpful to have inserted some description of the character of case involved, for
the petitions, briefs and records are not easily available to many in the profession.
The utility of the book might also have been enhanced by uniformity in references in the table of contents and the index. It is always confusing to find
references to sections without pages in the one, and to pages without sectionsi
in the other.
Whatever the sins of omission or commission may be, it can truthfully be
said that the framework of legal principles which the Court applies in the decision
of jurisdictional questions is there-logically laid out. Attention is called to
problems which might otherwise escape the average attorney. Where the question has been definitely settled there is reference to the cases, and the background
4. Mr. Robertson has served as law clerk to the late Chief Justice Taft and to the present
Chief Justice. Prior thereto he served in the office of the clerk of the Court. Mr. Kirkham
has served as law clerk to the Chief Justice and, previously, to Mr. Justice Sutherland. Mr.
Robertson is also the author of PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME CoURT OF THE
UNTED STATES (Rev. ed. 1929).
5. In the chapter on final judgments of state courts the authors state that "if, under state
law, a decision of the highest court of the state does not become final until the expiration of
the period allowed for applying for rehearing the judgment is not final within the meaning
of section 237 of the judicial Code until that period has expired unless final action upon an
application has theretofore been taken". Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. King County,
264 U. S. 22, 23 (1924), is given as authority for the statement. The use of the words "decision" and "judgment" is somewhat confusing for a final judgment, not decision, is necessary
for appellate review, and the two are not necessarily synonymous. The practice in the State
of Washington, from which the Puget Sound case came, should be compared with the practice
in the State of California where a rule of court provides that judgments of the supreme court
become final thirty days after pronouncement. The Supreme Court of the United States has
not yet expressed itself on the question as to when a judgment of the Supreme Court of the
State of California becomes final in the light of the latter court's rule and of Section 237 of
the Judicial Code.
6. Rule 74 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which have been adopted by the Supreme
Court and reported to Congress pursuant to the provisions of the Act of June 19, 1934, 48
STAT. io64 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723b, c (Supp. 1937), abolishes the necessity for summons and severance in cases covered by the rule so that this problem may be eliminated when
those rules become effective.
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is there as an aid in arriving at the solution of future problems. 7 Accepted with
the limitations which necessarily inhere in a textbook addressed to a subject of
such scope, the book is a valuable contribution to legal literature on the Court.
Richard W. Hogue, r.t

BOOK NOTES
By Clinch Calkins. Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1937.
Pp. 363. Price: $2.50.
The class war takes to the stage of the Senate Office Building, as a bewildering band of thugs and tycoons, of manufacturers and mobsters, "hooked men" and
"hookers" tread the boards to enlighten, admonish or simply badger the members
of the Civil Liberties Investigating Committee. Deftly utilizing flashes of the
LaFollette hearings for an effective stereopticon, impressario Calkins exhibits
the battle between property and people as it is waged along the grim front of
industrial espionage and strikebreaking.
No doubt, the lesson is that while the victims of the industrial detective
agencies are certainly the workers, very frequently the employers are their dupes.
For stronger than the incentive to serve his client is the labor spy's impulse to
prolong, or even create, an apparent need for his services. Willful padding of the
operative's report with scare fabrics, well devised to keep management worried,
and even actually fomenting tangible outbursts of discontent in the inner councils
of the union wherein the spy has managed to insinuate himself-these are admittedly the favorite means of serving this sef-preservatory urge.
Fairly empiric in approach, the author seems to acknowledge that labor
sometimes finds a strike more helpful than a statute and that, to management, iron
knuckles are apt to be more reassuring than injunctions. Taking conditions as
they are, the book sensibly remains a factual revelation rather than an emotional
jeremiad. Doubtless, this is the very reason which makes it such a convincing
damnation of the one-sidedness of American industrial relations.
SPY OVERHEAD.

Victor J. Roberts.1

By Bruce R. Trimble. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1938. Pp. 299. Price: $4.00.
The only biography of Morrison R. Waite should be welcome to the shelves
of law students, lawyers, and every American interested in the life of a lawyer
and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court whose best years were devoted to the
development of constitutional law in one of the most stirring periods of American
history. It is strange that biographers have not heretofore seized upon the life of
Waite as a subject. Born in Connecticut just twenty-seven years after the adoption of the Constitution which he subsequently interpreted and developed, Waite
attended Yale University where he distinguished himself as a scholar and leader
of his fellow students. Forsaking opportunities at home, Waite moved to Ohio
where he soon became recognized as one of the leading lawyers of the State.
The author of this biography sets forth vividly the untiring industry with which
CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE.

7. Interesting questions will arise from a reading of the chapters on appeals from district courts and a subsequent inspection of the Act of August 24, 1937, 50 STAT. 751, 28 U. S.
C. A. §§ 4o1, 349a, 380a, 17 (Supp. 1937).
t Law Clerk to the Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
t LL. B., 1937, University of Pennsylvania.
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Waite applied himself to his every undertaking. Although he was busy with his
law practice and politics, the future Chief Justice also found time for other civic
activities.
The turning point in Waite's life occurred, perhaps, when he was appointed
counsel for the United States in the Geneva Arbitration. After the United States
emerged successful from this, its greatest legal effort up to that time, Waite was
elected President of the Ohio Constitutional Convention. It was in the midst of
one of these sessions that a telegraphic message was handed to the speaker who
interrupted his address to announce the appointment of Waite as Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. It is typical of Waite that among the pandemonium that
ensued, he was calm and called the meeting to order to resume its regular
business. One of Waite's first moves as Chief Justice was an attempt to remove
politics from the bench. Persistently, he refused to have his name suggested for
the presidency, pointing out the gross impropriety of making a seat on the
Supreme Court a stepping-stone to something else.
More trying times than those during which Waite rose to the High Court
have seldom existed in American History. The Civil War had just ended and
the development of the Western States was in its infancy. The author has
profitably cast the greater part of Waite's life story into the opinions he handed
down as Chief justice, the dominating characteristic of which lies in the broad
discretion left to the state legislatures. He early decided that only privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, that the power of Congress under the equal protection clause is
restricted, and that the congressional plan of reconstruction should be overthrown.
Narrowly interpreting the due process clause, Waite favored an extensive police
power and introduced the doctrine of private property affected with a public
interest. His clairvoyance is revealed in his prophecy that, "The great difficulty
in the future will be to establish the demarcation between that which is private
and that in which the public has an interest". In Munn v. Illinois 1 Waite's
opinion resulted in a revolutionary transition from the individualistic conception
of the function of government to a new collectivism. Adapting his decisions to
the new developments of time and circumstance, Waite wrote over a thousand
opinions in his fourteen years on the bench. Just as his life, deftly presented in this
biography, is a part of the history of American constitutional law, so American
constitutional development cannot help revealing the personality of one of its
greatest contributors, Chief justice Waite.
S.M.C.

Fi= FAMous TRIALs. By R. Cornelius Raby. Washington Law Book Co.,
Washington, D. C., 1937. Pp. viii, 344. Price: $2.5o.
This book was obviously written for popular consumption rather than for
technical research. Consequently, the author attempts to present only the outstanding features of the trials selected, emphasizing the factual situation and the
evidence, and only incidentally referring to strictly legal issues. A simple, narrative style is employed, and every effort is made to avoid legalistic terms. As a
result, the reader has little difficulty in grasping the situation, the maneuvers of
counsel and the final outcome of the trials. In this respect, the author has certainly accomplished his purpose of enabling the ordinary reader to acquire a
fair knowledge of each trial in a few minute's reading. For those more interested
in detail, a bibliography is appended, which itself seems intended more for the
layman than for the lawyer, since most of the books referred to are non-technical.
I. 94 U. S. 113 (1877).
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The book is neatly arranged into five chapters, the titles of which are
descriptive of the type of trials reviewed: I. Political or Historical; II. Religious; III. Military; IV. Civil; V. Criminal. Within each chapter, the trials are
chronologically set forth. The earliest trial described is that of Socrates, in
399 B. C.; the most recent, that of Bruno Hauptmann, in 1935.
It is significant that there are included twenty-one political or historical, and
twenty criminal trials, while only two civil, three religious, and four military
trials have apparently achieved the fame required for a place in this collection.
It is also interesting to note that, of the political trials, only three arose in the
twentieth century, none after 1919, whereas thirteen of the criminal trials took
place during this century, four of them since 192o. This comparison, which is
more striking if the other classes are considered, may be either a barometer of
the modem taste in trials, or merely a testimonial to the speed with which criminal
trials, with the aid of the newspapers, are catapulted to fame.
Intellectually, this volume will add little to the normal reader's store of
knowledge. Few persons who have read a modicum of history, perused newspaper headlines and occasionally attended the cinema will fail to recognize such
famous names as Joan of Arc, Mary Queen of Scots, Aaron Burr, Dred Scott,
Alfred Dreyfus, Harry K. Thaw, Charles Becker, Sacco and Vanzetti, Loeb and
Leopold, Thomas J. Mooney, Lieutenant Thomas Massey, and so on through
almost the entire list of fifty. But perhaps this very fact will do much to popularize the book. For one achieves a sense of intellectual power, literary savoirfaire from recognizing the subject-matter of the work he is reading. Again, the
brief synopses call forth memories of books, plays, motion pictures, newspaper
and radio accounts wherein the cold facts so simply narrated by this author were
colored, the situations made glamorous, the characters even legended. In fine,
the likelihood of recognition is probably the chief attraction of this book, since
the greater the recognition, the greater the fame, and fame would seem to be the
sine qua non, if not the outstanding characteristic, of Fifty Famous Trials.
LR.S.

